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IS THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE WORTH
THE EFFORT?
by
JOSEPH L. DALY'
When Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon and advanced toward Rome his
opponents sent emissaries to "talk." They hoped that words and not short
swords would be the only weapons necessary to stop Caesar. The negotiations
failed - as they have so often throughout human history - but the fact that
they took place at all demonstrates a persistent hope that disputes can be
resolved peacefully. And, in a further bow to the principle that words can
make peace, Caesar allowed the emissaries to return to Rome unharmed.
From Genghis Khan to Pearl Harbor negotiations between belligerents
have taken place. "Parlementaires" are persons bearing white flags who go
behind enemy lines to negotiate directly with the enemy commander.
Not to kill or capture the emissary has been customary international law
from Biblical days. Both belligerents and nonbelligerents have found it
necessary to send ambassadors, diplomatic agents, and emissaries across walls
of hate in order to talk with one another. "Customary" international law has
required that such emissaries and diplomats receive safe conduct in and out of
the countries they visit. So on December 8, 1941, the day after the "Day of In-
famy," the United States government permitted Japanese diplomats to leave
the United States even though half the United States Naval Fleet lay wrecked
in Pearl Harbor.
Throughout history most peacemaking has been a response to a particular
crisis - efforts of two countries to solve a dispute by treaty or to negotiate the
end of a war. But as the instruments of war have become more and more horri-
ble, as wars have come to take an ever increasing toll on civilian populations,
world leaders have tried to establish a structure for peace, a permanent way of
avoiding conflict by appealing to reason, not to weapons. Our century has
hoped that some sort of international tribunal - a world court - would
decide disputes on enduring principles of justice, not on the size of battalions.
Skeptics look at the meager results of these efforts - the modern Interna-
tional Court of Justice issued less than one contentious case judgment a year in
its first 35 years of existence' - and wonder whether the world is ready for in-
ternational justice. Defenders point out that war is unthinkable in a nuclear
age and that international justice offers the best hope for peace.
*Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law.
1945-80, I C.J. YB. (1945-80).
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A QUICK HISTORY
The idea of international "talk" rather than "war" as the instrument for
the resolution of disputes between governments originated in modern times
with the Czar of Russia, Nicholas II. George Elian, in his book The Interna-
tional Court of Justice,' reports that in August of 1898 news of great
significance traveled around the world. Nicholas II had proposed to all the
countries of the world a great conference for the purpose of discussing arms
limitation and the prevention of war.3 Nicholas himself was concerned about
an article written in the Siberian village of Susenskoe by a man named Lenin.
Entitled "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," it gave a theoretical basis
to the mission of the ordinary person in the approaching revolution." The Czar
was frightened and hoped that an international conference on arms limitation
and peace would prevent an uprising in Russia.
Countries such as Germany and Russia praised the idea of an interna-
tional meeting.' The Hague, in the Netherlands, was chosen as the place for
such a lofty conference, thus avoiding the capitals of the great powers.
Although the great objective of disarmament failed to gain the support of the
26 participating countries at the conference held from May 18 to July 29,
1899, a commission was set up to study the problems.6
In 1907, the Second Hague Conference was called. Forty-four states even-
tually signed "The Convention for Pacific [Peaceful] Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes" on October 18, 1907, at the Hague.' The two Hague con-
ferences are often considered the first attempts to codify the vast domain of in-
ternational law and justice
The Second Hague Conference organized the Permanent Court of Ar-
bitration (PCA)9 to permit countries to place their disputes voluntarily before
an impartial court for resolution. Obviously, the PCA was unsuccessful in
resolving a major international dispute, World War I. In fact, said Kaiser
Wilhelm, "The Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,"
to which Germany was a signatory, "was simply a scrap of paper."
After World War I, "the war to end all wars," the League of Nations was
created.'0 World leaders hoped that through the League, war would no longer
IG. ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1971).
'Id. at 15.
'd.
'Although there were mixed reactions to the proposed international meeting, overall the feeling was a
positive one. Id. at 16.
'Id. at 17.
'Id. at 18.
'Id. at 19, n.5.
'Id. at 19.
"The League of Nations was established "in order to promote international cooperation among nations and
to achieve peace and security." Id. at 29.
[Vol. 20:3
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be used to resolve disputes. The League recognized that a totally voluntary
court of arbitration was not sufficient to resolve disputes. Consequently, the
League established the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). The
PCIJ, during its existence from 1922 to 1939, settled 83 cases involving differ-
ent countries through decisions, advisory opinions and injunctions." But just
as the Permanent Court of Arbitration was not able to resolve disputes leading
to World War I, neither the League of Nations nor the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice were able to prevent the outbreak of World War II.
After World War II, nations looking at the horror of world war recog-
nized that the League of Nations had to be strengthened. They felt that a new
international organization should be established. Such an organization would
base its activity on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peaceful states
and would be open to all states, big or small. 2 A major conference at San Fran-
cisco (April 25-June 26, 1945), with 50 participating nations, approved the
Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.,
The Permanent Court of Arbitration continued to exist for the voluntary
resolution of disputes through the arbitration process. But now a new Interna-
tional Court of Justice with expanded powers was established by participating
nations. While part of the United Nations, both were headquartered at the
tree-lined, peaceful atmosphere of The Hague in order to allow for judicial and
reasoned settlement of disputes and to avoid the political nature of the United
Nations in New York. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was conceived
as a powerful instrument for everlasting universal peace. 14
How THE COURT WORKS
According to its Charter, the U.N. attempts to maintain peace by settling
disputes "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."' 5
The document goes on to speak of "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilia-
tion, arbitration, [and] judicial settlement"'6 as means of maintaining peace.
The members of the United Nations are automatically parties to the
"Statute" establishing the International Court of Justice 7 and each "under-
takes to comply with the decision of the [court]."' 8 If one party to a suit fails to
"Id. at 35.
"Id. at 40. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
11G. ELIAN, supra note 2, at 40.
"For the history of the International Court of Justice, see L. DELBEZ, LES PRINCIPES GENERAUX
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Pichon-Durand, 456-459 (1964).
"U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1.
161d. at art. 33, para. 1.
"Id. at art. 93, para. 1.
'11d. at art. 94, para. 1.
Winter, 19871
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comply, the other may ask the Security Council to "make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."' 9
Either the U.N. General Assembly or other agencies of the U.N. may re-
quest "advisory opinions" of the International Court.2 0 This is one of the major
differences between the United States court system and the International
Court. Contrary to popular opinion, the United States Supreme Court does not
go charging off on its own to give opinions on all manner of cases. It has to be
presented with a genuine legal case or controversy requiring adjudication.',
The International Court, however, can give a legal opinion, even if there is no
formal case before it.
The ICJ consists of 15 judges elected by the General Assembly and the
Security Council of the United Nations from countries which are members of
the United Nations.2 The judges possess qualifications required in their respec-
tive countries for the appointment to the highest judicial offices. 3 The ICJ
judges represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems
of the world. There are judges from developed and Third World countries and
judges from capitalist and socialist systems. The judges serve full-time for nine
years. 4 The judges have diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in
court business. 5 They meet at the Peace Palace in The Hague," continuing the
tradition of the First Hague Conference of 1899. The ICJ is permanently in
session except during vacations. 7 Judges with the same nationality as one of
the parties do not have to disqualify themselves, but the opposing party can
"Id. at para. 2.
"°Id. at art. 96, para. 1.
"U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
"STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 3, para. I. The following is a list of the members
of the Court and the years in which their terms expire:
President: Taslim Olawale Elias, Nigeria (1994)
Vice President: Jose Sette Camara, Brazil (1988)
Platon Dmitrievich Morozov, U.S.S.R. (1988)
Roberto Ago, Italy (1988)
Stephen Schwebel, U.S. (1988)
Mohammed Bedjaoul, Algeria (1988)
Nagendra Singh, India (1991)
Jose Maria Ruda, Argentina (1991)
Robert Y. Jennings, United Kingdom (1991)
Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere, France (1991)
Keba Mbaye, Senegal (1991)
Jens Evensen, Norway (1994)
Ni Zhengyu, China (1994)
Manfred Lachs, Poland (1994)
Shigeru Oda, Japan (1994)
THE 1986 ALMANAC 320 (0. Johnson ed. 1986)
11Id. at art. 2.
"Id. at art. 13.
"Id. at art. 19.
6Id. at art. 22, para. 1.
"Id. at art. 23, para. 1.
[Vol. 20:3
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then choose a judge of the same nationality from a list of qualified candidates. 8
The salaries, allowances and compensation are all free of the taxing system of
any nation. The salary for ICJ judges as of October, 1985, was $85,000 a year
with an annual cost of living increase of $12,000.29
PROBLEMS
Jurisdiction has been one of the major disputes since the establishment of
the court in 1945. Only countries may be parties in cases before the court.3" An
individual who has a dispute with a nation cannot go before the ICJ for a
resolution of the dispute. And a corporation which has a dispute with a nation
may not go before the International Court of Justice unless the company per-
suades its own government to represent its interests.
Forty-seven states have agreed to compulsory jurisdiction of the court in
all legal disputes concerning:
1. the interpretation of a treaty;
2. any question of international law;
3. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation; and
4. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.3
211d. at art. 31, para. 1-2.
"U.N. GAORI (Agenda Item 116) at 5, U.N. Doc A/C.5/40/32 (1985). The President of the ICJ was receiv-
ing $94,200 annually in salary as of Oct. 1985. Id. at 6.
3 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 34, para. I.
3
"1d. at art. 36, para. 2. As of January 1, 1983, the forty-seven states that have agreed to compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the court include:
Australia Malay
Austria Malta
Barbados Mauritius
Belgium Mexico
Botswana Netherlands
Canada New Zealand
Columbia Nicaragua
Costa Rica Nigeria
Democratic Kampuchea Norway
Denmark Pakistan
Dominican Republic Panama
Egypt Philippines
El Salvador Portugal
Finland Somalia
Gambia Sudan
Haiti Swaziland
Honduras Sweden
India Switzerland
Israel Togo
Japan Uganda
Kenya United Kingdom of
Liberia Great Britain and
Liechtenstein Northern Ireland
Luxembourg United States of America
Uruguay
Winter, 1987]
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However, the vast majority of countries - including the United States
and the Soviet Union - have not agreed to the absolute compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the International Court of Justice. In fact, the United States, by the
Connally Amendment of 1946,32 which was inspired by John Foster Dulles
and passed by the U.S. Senate, maintains certain reservations as to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice's jurisdiction. The U.S. refuses to subject itself to the
jurisdiction of the court when the U.S. deems that the dispute is essentially do-
mestic or where the U.S. deems that the dispute arises under a multilateral
treaty.33
The Connally Amendment doesn't mean, however, that the court can't
assert jurisdiction in a case involving the United States. In fact, the court has
the power to decide questions of its own jurisdiction.34 In this, it is like
American courts, which can hear and decide a case even if one of the parties
doesn't agree.
Unlike American courts, however, the International Court can't be sure
of enforcing its decrees. Lacking the normal apparatus of a nation-state, such
as police forces and other agencies of government, it is forced to go into the
political arena - the Security Council - to compel obedience to its decisions.
The rules of the Security Council (the vote of any one of the permanent
members can veto action)35 and the realities of world politics make it unlikely
that vigorous action will take place in any truly controversial case.
Here is where self-limiting provisions like the Connally Amendment come
into play. The United States is on record as being committed to world peace
through justice, and in the absence of a shield like the Connally Amendment,
our country might find it difficult to ignore a decision of the International
Court or to veto its implementation in the Security Council. With the amend-
ment, however, we feel justified in asserting our independence of the court.36
A good recent example involves the United States and Nicaragua.
Nicaragua contends that a fishing trawler sank in the Pacific port of Corinto,
Nicaragua, after striking a mine that was laid by CIA-directed operatives.
Nicaragua contends this was part of a program sponsored by the Reagan ad-
ministration to harass Nicaraguan shipping.
The government of Nicaragua requested the International Court of
Justice to declare that such activities are in violation of international law, since
E. OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES, AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 404 (1985).
3261 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 4 Bevans 140, 1 U.N.T.S. 9.
"Id. See also Humphrey, The United States, the World Court and the Connally Amendment, I I VA. J. INTL
L. 310 (1971).
'
4STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, para. 6.
"U.N. CHARTER. supra note 15, at art. 38. See also THE 1986 ALMANAC 319 (0. Johnson ed. 1986).
"Humphrey, supra note 33.
[Vol. 20:3
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war has not been declared by the United States against Nicaragua, and re-
quested an assessment of damages and an injunction ordering the United
States government to stop supporting such activities."
The Reagan administration attempted to nullify the Nicaraguan action by
announcing that it was amending its declaration to suspend the jurisdiction of
the World Court regarding any matter brought against the U.S. concerning
Central America." The administration took this step on April 9, 1984, the day
before Nicaragua filed proceedings against the United States. 9 The time of
suspension was two years. Nicaraguan representatives in Washington, D.C.
claimed that the U.S. action was of no effect, because by the terms of the
original U.S. declaration any termination or revocation had to be given with at
least six months notice to be effective.4 One effect of the Reagan administra-
tion's attempt to thwart the jurisdiction of the World Court was condemnation
by the American Society of International Law, which for the first time in its
history issued a statement condemning the actions of the United States. The
statement requested the administration to "rescind its efforts to turn aside the
ICJ's jurisdiction.""1
The proceedings instituted by Nicaragua against the United States were
brought before the International Court of Justice in early May, 1984.2 Since
World War II this was the first time that the United States appeared as a defen-
dant to contest provisional measures. In its defense the United States raised
two arguments. The first step taken by the United States was to invoke "its sus-
pension of consent to compulsory jurisdiction with respect to any disputes con-
cerning Central America. 43 The second step taken was its argument that Nic-
aragua had "no right" to plead before the World Court because it never filed in-
struments of ratification to officially accept the court's jurisdiction."4
The World Court ruled, by a fifteen to zero margin, that the United States
was to "immediately cease and refrain from any action restricting, blocking, or
endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the laying
of mines.""5 By a fourteen to one vote the World Court also held that the
right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed by the
Republic of Nicaragua, like any other State of the region of the world,
"Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the United States" Attempted Withdrawal From the Jurisdiction Of The
World Court In The Proceedings Initiated By Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 295, 297 (1984).
3"Id.
39Id.
4°N.Y. Times, April 10, 1984, at Al, col. 6, A8, col. 1.
"Hassan, supra note 37, at 298, citing Id., April 13, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
"Hassan, supra note 37, at 299.
4Id.
44d.
"Id., quoting Military and Parliamentary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 4,
22, reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATTERS 468, 477 (1984).
Winter, 19871
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should be fully respected and should not in any way be jeopardized by any
military and paramilitary activities which are prohibited by the principles
of international law, in particular the principle that States should refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the
political independence of any state, and the principle concerning the duty
not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State,
principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the
Organization of American States."
The United States told the World Court that it had already stopped mining the
Nicaraguan harbors and the ICJ decided that written proceedings should first
be addressed to the issue of the court's jurisdiction.47 The result then, was in-
terim relief without reaching the merits of the dispute. However, the ICJ has
since then ruled to accept jurisdiction of the case. 8
The proceedings instituted by Nicaragua against the United States were
finally decided "on the merits" on June 27, 1986."9 The World Court held that
"the Reagan Administration had broken international law and violated Nica-
raguan sovereignty by aiding the anti-Government rebels."5 The court ruled
that the United States must pay reparation to Nicaragua but it deferred a Nica-
raguan petition which sought $370 million in damages from the United
States.5 Although the World Court lacks enforcement powers, it stated that if
no settlement was reached between the two nations, it would step back into the
matter.
In ruling against the United States, the court rejected the defense that the
United States was "acting in the 'collective self-defense' of El Salvador, Costa
Rica, and Honduras because Nicaragua was supporting rebel movements in
'Hassan, supra note 37, at 299. The sole dissenter was United States Judge Stephen M. Schwebel.
"Id. at 300.
"Id. at n.28.
"N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at A 1, col. 2. The article which reported the l.C.J's decision included a synop-
sis at A.4, col. 6, on the I.C.J. It read:
The International Court of Justice, commonly known as the World Court, is an agency of the United
Nations. The court, with headquarters in the Hague, was established for nations, and individuals may
not sue or be sued. The court has jurisdiction in all cases that the parties agree to refer to it and in
other matters provided for in the United Nations Charter or other treaties.
If there is a dispute about whether the court has jurisdiction, the court settles the issue.
Countries are not required to submit disputes to the court. Countries may say they recognize the
court's jurisdiction as compulsory in cases involving the interpretation of a treaty or of international
law; a decision on whether there has been a breach of an international obligation, or a settlement of
any reparations for a breach of an international obligation. Such declarations are binding only if both
parties have made a similar declaration.
Countries have often qualified such declarations. The United States, accepting the court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction in 1946, excluded matters of domestic jurisdiction "as determined by the United
States of America." The United States has also withdrawn from court jurisdiction in dispute involving
Central America. The court, which has no enforcement powers, has 15 judges elected for renewable
nine-year terms by votes of the General Assembly and Security Council. Five judges are elected every
three years. No judge may be dismissed except by a unanimous finding by the other judges that he no
longer fulfills conditions for service. Id. at A4, col. 6.
0Id. at AI, col. 2.
"Id. at A4, col. 4.
[Vol. 20:3
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these countries." 52
The United States was found liable on a variety of grounds including
breach of its duties "not to use force against another state, not to intervene in
its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime
commerce."53 The production and dissemination of a manual to contra forces
was judged to be "contrary to general principles of humanitarian law" but did
not support a basis for concluding that acts committed pursuant to the
manual's content could be imputed to the United States."
The nature of United States' response mirrored the response it had to the
court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over the case. A State Department
spokesman stated that although a decision had been rendered, "[tihe court is
simply not equipped to deal with a case of this nature involving complex facts
and intelligence information."55 The court was also criticized for premising its
decision solely on the Nicaraguan version of the facts.56 However the United
States refused to present its case to the court claiming that due to the confiden-
tial nature of the information necessary to put on its case, the United States
could not make said information available. Although the State Department
spokesman did not state what the exact United States response would be, at
least one observer noted that "it seemed apparent that the Administration
would not comply."57 Should that happen, the Nicaraguans would appear to be
left without a remedy although diplomats say that Nicaragua can use the deci-
sion it received to cause the United States "diplomatic embarrassment" in cer-
tain areas including those involving the United Nations. 8
ON THE OTHER FOOT
In the Iranian hostage case, the tables were turned and it was the U.S.
seeking the court's jurisdiction and its opponent denying it. In The United
States Diplomatic and Counselor Staff in Tehran59 case the United States
government voluntarily requested the ICJ to rule on the occupation of its em-
bassy in Tehran.
Judge Taslim 0. Elias, President of the ICJ, reports in his 1983 book The
International Court of Justice and Some Contemporary Problems, that on
121d. at A4, col. 5.
"Id. at A4, col. 3.
'Id. at A4, col. 3-4.
"Id. at A4, col. 2.
mId. at A4, col. 3.
57Id.
"1Id. at A4, col. 5.
"United States of America v. Iran, Order of Dec. 24, 1979, I.C.J. Report 1979, 23; see also idem Judgment,
I.C.J. Report of Judgments 1980, 3.
61T. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROB-
LEMS (1983).
Winter, 19871
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November 4, 1979, in the course of the demonstration outside the United
States Embassy compound in Tehran, the Embassy premises were attacked
and there was no effective intervention on the part of the Iranian security
forces to relieve the situation, despite repeated calls for help from the Embassy.
The United States filed a memorial (a legal written document more commonly
referred to as a complaint in U.S. courts) before the International Court of
Justice, asking that the government of Tehran immediately release all
hostages, clear the premises of the United States Embassy, ensure that all per-
sons attached to the U.S. Embassy be accorded full diplomatic and counselor
functions, not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy, and ensure
that no action be taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States.6'
The hearing was set for December 10, 1979, before the International
Court of Justice. The Iranian government refused to recognize the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice, but on December 9, 1979, the Iranian
government sent a long telegram stating that Iran wished to express its respect
for the International Court of Justice and its distinguished members and re-
quested that "the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case
which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it." 62
Iran asserted that the question of the "hostages of the American Embassy
in Tehran"... represented a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall
problem, one which could not be studied separately and which involved,
inter alia, more than twenty-five years of continual interference by the
United States in the internal affairs of Iran, a shameless exploitation of
Iran and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, con-
trary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms."'63
Iran emphasized that the problem involved in the conflict was not one of inter-
pretation and application of treaties, but one which resulted from an overall
situation containing much more fundamental and much more complex
elements. Therefore Iran failed to appear before the International Court to
argue its case.
Nevertheless, the International Court took jurisdiction of the matter and
delivered a judgment on May 24, 1980, that Iran had violated and was still
violating the obligations owed by it to the United States under long-established
rules of general international law." The court also ruled that no member of the
U.S. diplomatic or counselor staff should be kept in Iran and that Iran should
make reparations to the U.S. government for injury caused to or at or by
seizure of the Embassy, consulates, and the diplomatic and other personnel.
"Id. at 287.
62Id.
"Id. at 287-88.
"Id. at 293.
[Vol. 20:3
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The court, in one of its concluding remarks said:
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them
to physical constraints of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with
the principles of the United Nations, as well as the fundamental principles
enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But what has
above all to be emphasized is the extent and seriousness of the conflict of
the Iranian state and its obligations to the whole corpus of the interna-
tional rules of which diplomatic and consular law is comprised, rules the
fundamental character of which the court must here again strongly affirm
65
Thus the United States obtained a pronouncement from the International
Court of Justice that Iran had broken international law, even though the Irani-
an government refused to accept the jurisdiction of the court. As Judge Elias
admits, "it is a sad fact to note that the Order of the Court in this case was
flouted and remained unheeded." Elias goes on to note that the United States
itself violated an earlier order of the court to refrain from action which might
further aggravate tensions between the two countries. According to Elias, the
American incursion into Iran to rescue the hostages, however understandable
in view of the immense frustrations inherent in the situation, was an action
"calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international rela-
tions." 6
Ultimately, the hostages were released, though as a result of negotiations,
not of the court decision.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The ICJ function is to decide cases in accordance with international law.
How does the International Court of Justice determine what is international
law? Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to the
bodies of law which the court uses in the resolution of disputes between and
among countries. 7 First are international conventions. These are treaties
entered into between and among countries. Second is international custom as
evidence of the general practice which has been accepted as law. For example,
diplomatic immunity has been accepted as international custom. Third are
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. For example, the con-
cept of individual freedom, the denial of which is forbidden without due pro-
cess of law, has become a human rights principle of law recognized by all
civilized nations and by the International Court of Justice. Deprivation of
freedom without a fair trial should not be permitted by civilized nations.
"Id. at 294.
"Id. at 295.
"STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38.
Winter, 19871
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Finally, the court looks to judicial decisions and the teachings of other
jurists of the various nations as a subsidiary means of determining rules of law.
Consequently cases of a similar nature which have been heard in the highest
court of other countries will be studied by the International Court of Justice
for whatever precedential value such cases may have. Of course the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is not bound by such decisions. In fact the court is not
even bound by its own previous decisions in such matters.
PROCEDURE IN THE ICJ
The official languages of the court are French and English.6 8 The actual
proceedings at the International Court of Justice have similarities both to trial
courts and to appellate courts. The procedure is in two parts, written and
oral.69 The parties file memorials, countermemorials and, if necessary, replies.
The oral proceedings consist of a hearing in which there are first witnesses an
then arguments to the court by the advocates. 0 As noted in the discussion of
the Iranian case, even if one of the parties does not appear before the court, the
court can take jurisdiction of the matter if the court itself determines it has
jurisdiction. If a third country feels that its interests are involved it can submit
a request to intervene in the case. All questions are decided by a majority of
the judges present, and written decisions are rendered by the judges.7' The deci-
sion has no binding force (even precedential force) except between the parties
in respect to the particular case." Once a decision is rendered by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice there is no appeal."
The International Court of Justice from 1945 up to the Iranian hostage
case in 1980 issued only 30 judgments in cases in which two parties in dispute
argued the case before the ICJ. In its first twenty-four years of existence, the
ICJ "received about fifty cases, rendered judgments in twenty-one, and...
issued thirteen advisory opinions."
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
A listing of some of the strengths and weaknesses of the International
Court of Justice may help you formulate your own ideas as to whether the In-
ternational Court of Justice is worth the effort.
6SId. at art. 39, para. 1.
691d. at art. 43, para. 1.
11d. at art. 43, para. 5.
"Id. at art. 55, para. 1.
"Id. at art. 59.
"Id. at art. 60.
1'G. ELIAN, supra note 2, at 96. For a further breakdown of the number and types of cases decided by the
I.C.J., see J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 67-68 (1981).
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Strengths
1. "Although 'peace under the law' has been an unattainable ideal, peace
without the law is unimaginable," writes R.P. Anand, Professor of Interna-
tional Law at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. "In the present
dangerous thermonuclear age, mankind needs peace and needs it desperately.
It is generally acknowledged that law in some form is an indispensable means.
One of the necessary conditions for a more effective law is to strengthen and
improve the institutions and processes for law's administration.",
2. There is a universal need for peaceful settlement of disputes. The Inter-
national Court of Justice provides an opportunity to intervene in disputes and
to resolve them short of armed warfare.
3. The International Court of Justice enhances the role of an interna-
tional legal order.
4. The International Court of Justice provides an opportunity to lessen
the role of national interest and create a more global consideration. Each of us
who has looked at pictures of earth from satellites recognize we are all in this
together.
5. The court can act in an advisory capacity as a teacher, pointing out the
ideals of mankind to be achieved through the rule of law.7"
6. The court can be a source of law.
7. The court provides a hope for a world built on law and justice.
8. Law provides the opportunity for stability and security.
9. The ICJ offers an opportunity to depoliticize decisions."
Weaknesses
1. The political and ideological divisions of world society cause a crisis of
confidence in the court.78
2. Only a small minority of the member states have accepted compulsory
jurisdiction. 9
3. Countries are reluctant to make use of the court. There seems to be a
preference for nonjudicial means to resolve disputes rather than by the court
applying positive international law.'" For example, negotiation, mediation,
"Anand, Role ofInternational Adjudication, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE I (L. Gross ed. 1976).
76STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 65.
"Anand, supra note 75, at I.
'"d. at 2.
"STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, para. 2.
'Anand, supra note 75, at 4.
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conciliation, and even warfare seem to be the preferred methods of dispute
resolution. Unlike the Islamic and the Christian West, Asian countries - Con-
fucian China, Hindu India and Buddhist nations of Southeast Asia - because
of their intuitive philosophies and religions have great reluctance to settling
disputes by recourse to law and the processes of litigation.
4. Independent states are jealous of their sovereignty and skeptical about
leaving control over their affairs to third parties.
5. With the growth of new nations arising out of the decay and destruc-
tion of colonial rule, different sets of cultural and legal values operate globally.
There is concern that the International Court of Justice reflects a Western
tradition of dispute resolution."s
6. It is argued that there are structural deficiencies of the International
Court of Justice.82 Although the impartiality of its decisions and the integrity
of its judges are unquestionable, many newly independent countries of Asia
and Africa argue that traditional international law is Euro-centric and is biased
in favor of European and American states.
7. What is customary international law? Some states feel that customary
international law is law which came into custom because it was imposed by
eight or nine of the most powerful countries.83 (Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice calls for the general principles of international
law "accepted by civilized nations.")
8. Is there really a common law for all mankind?
9. Although the International Court of Justice seems to be a good idea, is
the fact that it is used so little recognition of its impotence? Nations seem not
to have given whole-hearted support to resolving disputes by the International
Court of Justice.
10. The International Court of Justice itself has no enforcement authori-
ty. Enforcement power lies only through the United Nations. Of the United
Nations, Professor Leo Gross of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of
Tufts University, has said, "In my view the performance of the United Nations
in dispute settlement as distinguished from stopping hostilities is very un-
satisfactory." 4
11. "Only countries may be parties in cases before the court." (Article 34
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.) This then precludes
private parties involved in international disputes, companies and businesses,
"Id. at 5-7.
1Jd. at 9.
11Id. at 10.
4L. Gross, The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements For Enhancing Its Role In
The International Legal Order, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
31 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
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from using the ICJ. It also prevents guerilla groups and insurgents alleging
violations of human rights by their own governments from using the ICJ to
settle grievances.
UNIQUE PROCEDURES
How does the International Court of Justice compare with an American
trial court and with the U.S. Supreme Court? Article 43 of the Statute of the
ICJ describes the procedure and proceedings. This chart provides a simple
comparison.
American Trial Court
Complaint/
Answer
testimony of witnesses
jury
closing argument by
lawyer to jury
judge
verdict or judgment
individuals and
governments as
parties
U.S. Supreme Court
Appellant's Brief/
Respondent's Brief
no testimony
no jury
argument to the
court
9 justices appointed
by president
Written opinion;
no advisory
opinions
individuals and
governments as
parties
IcJ
Memorial/
Counter-memorial
testimony of
witnesses
no jury
argument to the
court
15 judges
by United
Nations
Written opinion;
advisory opinion
only nations as
parties
CONCLUSIONS
A number of the strengths and weaknesses have been discussed in this ar-
ticle. Ultimately, there seem to be three schools of thought concerning the In-
ternational Court of Justice. The first accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court concerning the resolution of disputes with other state
members. This school trusts the ability, integrity, and rationality of the justices
to peacefully resolve disputes among global neighbors. Such states necessarily
yield some sovereign decisionmaking power. However, few states have ac-
cepted compulsory jurisdiction," and many maintain some reservation limiting
the scope of the jurisdiction accepted.1
Countries following the second school of thought, including the United
8 See note 31.
"See note 32.
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States, have declared acceptance of jurisdiction by the International Court but
include "self-judging reservations."87 The United States has declared in the
Connally Amendment that it will not accept the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice when "disputes with regard to matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as deter-
mined by the United States ofAmerica" (emphasis added).88 Six other nations,
including France, 9 have such "self-judging" reservations.
The third school involves countries like the Soviet Union which are total-
ly opposed to the normative character of international law itself. Consequently
no matter what improvements could be made in the composition of the court
and in the application of international law, such member states would not be
induced to change their conduct. Although the Soviet Union has had judges
sitting on the International Court of Justice, it has never subjected itself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Judge Taslim 0. Elias of the International Court of Justice has noted a
number of contemporary questions needing resolution. He says the Interna-
tional Court of Justice could serve a valuable role by elucidating human rights,
diplomatic law, the law of the sea, wars of national liberation and human-
itarian law, and the legal aspects of the new international economic order.9"
It is certainly valid to ask whether the International Court of Justice can
be a force for peace. International justice is an ideal obviously not yet achieved.
Nevertheless, justice is as dear to mankind as is the idea of peace among
peoples.
Although neither the United Nations nor the International Court of
Justice have achieved their ultimate purposes "to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war"" (first sentence of the Charter of the United
Nations), it is easy to agree with George Elian, former Vice President of the
Supreme Court of the Socialist Republic of Romania and Ambassador to the
United Nations, when he says: "We nourish the hope that the problems regard-
ing the improvement of the activity in this domain should find their solution in
the not too distant future."92
The reality of thermonuclear war leads us to recognize "that we live in a
jungle world imperfectly ameliorated by humanity's continuous struggle
against unreason,"93 according to Professor Anand. With this reality in mind,
vId.
88Id.
"DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 370 (Shabtai Rosenne ed. 1979).
"ELIAS. supra note 60, at 149.
"U.N. CHARTER, first sentence.
"ELIAN, supra note 2, at 12.
"Anand, supra note 75, at I.
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it is certainly worth our effort to continue attempts to resolve disputes in a
reasoned and legal manner. The International Court of Justice may still be one
of the world's best hopes to resolve conflicts between and among nations in
this imperfect jungle world.
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